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LEGITIMIZING ELECTIONS THROUGH 
THE REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING: A COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND HOPE 
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
Michael P. Lowry* 
Abstract: Actual or apparent corruption can seriously undermine any 
democratic system. This Article examines two approaches to tackling 
this problem in South Africa. The libertarian approach, used in the 
United States, embodies a strong presumption against regulation of 
campaign financing on the basis that it is a violation of the constitu-
tional rights to free speech and association. The weak regulations that 
result from this system do little to stem the influence of a powerful few 
on the outcomes of national elections. A better approach for South Af-
rica is the egalitarian model, used in both the United Kingdom and 
Canada. This model focuses on leveling the playing field for partici-
pants. Under this model, rights are subject to greater regulation so long 
as the government can provide sufficient justification. South Africa’s 
current system, by requiring proportional national funding of political 
parties, but leaving private financing largely unregulated, has resulted 
in a virtual one-party state in which private funding dominates. To solve 
these problems, South Africa should embrace the egalitarian model by 
implementing spending caps and increasing transparency. 
Introduction 
 Elections are at the center of politics in democracies. A problem 
confronted by many democratic nations concerns how the activities of 
the candidates, interest groups, and individual participants in an elec-
tion are financed. Candidates and interest groups must have the means 
to pay for the activities associated with a successful electoral campaign, 
such as advertisements. The electorate and the nation as a whole, how-
ever, are concerned with the appearance of undue influence or out-
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right corruption, which if present may detract from the public’s confi-
dence in the democratic process. The rules that govern financing must 
therefore strive to achieve a balance that both allows candidates and 
interest groups access to the funds necessary to participate in the po-
litical process, and yet does not detract from the integrity of the elected 
government. 
 Corruption and undue influence can take many forms,1 but this 
Article focuses on efforts to curtail these factors in democratic elections. 
In the countries discussed in this Article, finance rules revolve around 
constitutional provisions. In the United States, political parties and can-
didates must abide by contribution limitations designed to prevent cor-
ruption and that the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed as constitu-
tional.2 In Canada, both candidates and interest groups are required to 
abide by expenditure limitations,3 despite the freedom of expression 
provision guaranteed by the Canadian Charter.4 South Africa takes these 
systems one step further and explicitly requires non-exclusive public 
funding of political parties in its constitution.5 However, unlike Canada 
and the United States, South Africa currently does not require contribu-
tion disclosure and, despite its progressive constitutional provisions, has 
a largely unregulated political financing system.6 
 This Article is organized in three parts. Part I reviews South Af-
rica’s political history and the current status of its election finance 
regulation system in order to highlight the need for comprehensive 
and transparent regulation of campaign financing. Part II explores the 
legal framework regarding campaign financing in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Canada. This Article concludes by compar-
ing these systems, and offering general recommendations as to how 
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Jarmila Lajcakova, Violation of Human Rights Through State Tolerance of 
Street-Level Bribery: Case Study, Slovakia, 9 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 111 (2003) (examining 
corruption of Slovakian government at multiple levels); Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in 
Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 
Brook. J. Int’l L. 9 (2005) (describing effects of corruption on Nigerian judiciary). 
2 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27, 28–29, 
143–44 (1976). 
3 Canada Elections Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 9 (Can.). 
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
§ 2(b) (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter]. 
5 See S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 236. 
6 See Nico Steytler, The Legislative Framework Governing Party Funding in South Africa, in 
The Politics of State Resources: Party Funding in South Africa 59, 64 (Khabele 
Matlosa ed., 2004) (the limited public funding in South Africa is regulated but private 
contributions are not) [hereinafter The Politics of State Resources]. 
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South Africa may implement a regulatory system consistent with its 
constitution that inspires confidence in elected government. 
I. South Africa: A Brief History of the Franchise 
 South Africa’s history and its system of apartheid are well docu-
mented and need not be discussed in detail here.7 To begin to appreci-
ate the need for transparency in South African elections, however, it is 
necessary to have a basic understanding of the effect of racial politics 
on the franchise. The earliest Boer settlers defined the franchise as 
“one white man, . . . one vote.”8 As a result, race and politics were 
linked from the very moment European immigrants arrived and cre-
ated an environment in which the right of non-Europeans to vote was 
routinely circumscribed.9 Even in Cape Colony (the Cape), the only 
colony in which non-whites could vote prior to the formation of the 
Union of South Africa in 1909,10 there seemed little doubt that univer-
sal suffrage for non-whites was undesirable, leading to economic quali-
fications that ensured only those “who, in point of intelligence, are 
qualified for the exercise of political power” were eligible.11 After 1909, 
South Africa’s history of racially-biased voting was further institutional-
ized and “placed the political future of all citizens other than the whites 
in the hands of the white voters. . . . [Furthermore] it ensured that ad-
ditions of non-white voters to the voters’ list would occur only if the 
predominantly white electorate agreed.”12 
 From 1909 through 1994, the voting rights of non-whites became 
increasingly restricted and the rights already in place in the Cape were 
undermined.13 For example, in 1930, white women twenty-one and 
older were unconditionally granted the right to vote,14 thus diluting the 
voting strength of non-whites. The Natives Representation Act of 1936 
                                                                                                                      
7 See generally Nancy L. Clark, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (2004) 
(providing general history of apartheid era); Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern 
South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy (2007) (same). 
8 Eric A. Walker, The Franchise in Southern Africa, 11 Cambridge Hist. J. 93, 94 (1953). 
9 See generally id. (detailing early history of South Africa and efforts to restrict vote to 
white citizens). 
10 Peggy Maisel, Lessons from the World Conference Against Racism: South Africa as a Case 
Study, 81 Or. L. Rev. 739, 752 (2002). 
11 Walker, supra note 8, at 97. 
12 Kenneth A. Heard, General Elections in South Africa 1943–1970 1 (1974). 
13 See generally Ian Loveland, By Due Process of Law? Racial Discrimination and 
the Right to Vote in South Africa 1885–1960 (1999) (detailing history of voting rights 
in South Africa). 
14 See Heard, supra note 12, at 2. Similarly, the voting age for whites was reduced from 
twenty-one to eighteen in 1958. See id. at 3. 
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eliminated the single, multiracial voting roll in the Cape.15 In its place, 
the Act created two separate roles, one for whites and one for non-
whites.16 Non-whites, however, could only elect three white representa-
tives.17 Because of these separate voter rolls, a 1939 census revealed that 
of all registered voters, ninety-seven percent were white Europeans.18 
 Although “native” voters had some marginal representation in Par-
liament,19 legislative enactments repeatedly undermined this represen-
tation until its elimination in 1968.20 Furthermore, the system of appor-
tionment counted only the number of white voters in each province,21 
resulting in a dramatic under-representation of regions with large non-
white populations.22 As a result of this systematic eradication of the 
non-European franchise, by 1977 not only was eighty-four percent of 
South Africa’s adult population ineligible to vote, but these South Afri-
cans would likely have been indifferent to the results of the election: 
regardless of the outcome, a pro-apartheid Nationalist majority would 
emerge.23 
 Universal suffrage put an end to South Africa’s minority govern-
ment. Government corruption, however, persisted, which likely had 
significant effects on voter confidence.24 The corruption of apartheid 
governments was no secret.25 Even after the much-heralded 1994 elec-
tions, in 1996 forty-four percent of the public felt most officials were 
corrupt, and a further forty-one percent believed corruption was in-
creasing.26 Even in 2007, charges of corruption reached the highest 
                                                                                                                      
15 See Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa 161 (3d ed. 2000). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Walker, supra note 8, at 110 (stating that 1939 census revealed 1,083,685 voters, 
of which 1,053,555 were classified as European and 30,130 as non-European). 
19 S. Afr. Const. 1983 § 32. In 1983, the South African Constitution created houses in 
Parliament for non-whites (including “coloureds” and Indians); however, the President’s 
Council (composed primarily of whites) was authorized to pass legislation without the 
consent of these parliamentary bodies. Id. 
20 See Heard, supra note 12, at 3 (describing variety of acts Parliament implemented 
that undermined non-white voting). 
21 Id. at 8. 
22 Id. at 5. 
23 Matthew Midlane, The South African General Election of 1977, 78 Afr. Aff. 371, 371 
(1979). 
24 See generally Lajcakova, supra note 1; Oko, supra note 1. 
25 See Tom Lodge, Political Corruption in South Africa, 97 Afr. Aff. 157, 165–69 (1998) 
(documenting multiple examples of corruption in apartheid government). 
26 Id. at 157. 
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levels of government.27 For example, former Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma along with his aide Schabir Shaik were charged regarding pay-
ments made to secure a 30 million rand defense contract.28 Despite 
these and other charges, Zuma was recently elected head of the ANC 
and is considered the favorite to succeed Thabo Mbeki as President of 
South Africa in the next election.29 
 Corruption affects much more than campaign finance regula-
tion.30 It also weakens a nation by decreasing public confidence in elec-
tion results. One important step toward cleaning up the government’s 
image and ensuring the public’s continued confidence in election re-
sults would be to force political parties and politicians to disclose the 
sources of their campaign funds to public scrutiny. 
II. The Constitutional Foundations, Evolution, and Current 
Status of Selected Countries 
 There are two decidedly different models by which the countries 
compared in this Article attempt to regulate campaign funding. These 
models provide a context in which the judicial decisions of each coun-
try may be considered. Comparatively speaking, the United States uses 
a libertarian model in which regulations will not be allowed that in any 
manner violate constitutional rights. Canada and the United Kingdom 
employ a more egalitarian model in which rights are not absolute and 
even the most fundamental rights may be infringed if sufficient justifi-
cation exist. As will be seen, these two models provide decidedly differ-
ent regulatory atmospheres. 
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., Toni Hassan, Turbulence Ahead for South African Democracy, Canberra Times 
(Aust.), Dec. 22, 2007; Chris McGreal, Report Attacks S African Crime and Corruption, Guard-
ian (London), Jan. 29, 2007, at 16; South Africa: Curbing Bribery and Corruption, Afr. News, 
July 21, 2003. 
28 See Vicki Robinson & Stefaans Brümmer, Institute for Security Studies, SA De-
mocracy Incorporated: Corporate Fronts and Political Party Funding 12–13 (2006), 
http://www.whofundswho.org/pubs/studiespubs/isspaper129.pdf; see also Alex Eliseev, Zuma 
Stands Accused of a Decade of Corruption, Mercury (S. Afr.), Dec. 31, 2007, at 1 (providing de-
tails of scandal surrounding ANC President Jacob Zuma); Mpumelelo Mkhabela & Wisani wa 
ka Ngobeni, Zuma Probe was the Beginning of the End, Sunday Times (S. Afr.), Jan. 27, 2008, at 4 
(same). 
29 Patrick Laurence, Zuma: Man of Many Faces, but Nobody’s Fool, Sunday Indep. (S. 
Afr.), Feb. 24, 2008, at 8. 
30 See Lodge, supra note 25, at 158 (providing various explanations of what constitutes 
corruption). 
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A. The United States 
 Prior to the Watergate scandal, there had been relatively little 
regulation of campaign contributions or expenditures.31 In the wake of 
abuses by the Nixon Administration, however, Congress enacted the 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA).32 FECA 
created four requirements aimed at controlling the influence of money 
in politics and increasing the transparency of elections.33 These re-
quirements included: (1) disclosure of contributions; (2) limits on the 
size of campaign contributions; (3) limits on campaign expenditures; 
and (4) public financing of presidential campaigns.34 Yet, as will be 
seen, every effort to plug the proverbial hole in the campaign financing 
dam seems only to have created a new hole elsewhere.35 
1. FECA and Buckley 
  FECA was immediately subjected to a legal challenge on the 
grounds that it infringed multiple constitutional rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.36 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court gener-
ally upheld mandatory disclosure of campaign contributors while re-
jecting, for the most part, an argument that “compelled disclosure, in 
itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guar-
anteed by the First Amendment.”37 The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ 
argument that the requirement infringed associational rights.38 
 The Court in Buckley also recognized there could be limited situa-
tions in which disclosure could be harmful,39 and stated that to qualify 
for an exception, a group must show a “reasonable probability that the 
compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject them 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Bryan R. Whittaker, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption: Regulating 
Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC, 79 Ind. L.J. 1063, 1069 (2004). 




35 See Ivor Sarakinsky, Political Party Finance in South Africa: Disclosure Versus Secrecy, 14 De-
mocratization 111, 119 (2007) (quoting R. Austin & M. Tjernström, Funding of Po-
litical Parties and Election Campaigns 189–91 (2003), available at www.idea.int/        
publications/funding_parties/upload/full.pdf). 
36 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1–3 (1976). 
37 Id. at 64. 
38 Id. at 84 (“In summary, we find no constitutional infirmities in the recordkeeping, 
reporting, and disclosure provisions of the Act.”). 
39 Id. at 71 (“There could well be a case . . . where the threat to the exercise of First 
Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstan-
tial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.”). 
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to threats, harassment, or reprisals . . . .”40 Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 
Campaign Committee applied the Buckley criteria and found compelled 
disclosure would have a chilling effect on the Committee’s freedom of 
association, thereby exempting it from reporting requirements.41 
 The Buckley Court’s analysis of both contribution and expenditure 
limitations focused on “whether the specific legislation that Congress 
has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously 
discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment.”42 In applying a strict scrutiny 
analysis to the contribution limitations, the Court found Congress’s in-
terest stemmed from “the Act’s primary purpose to limit the actuality 
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 
contributions . . . .”43 Upholding the contribution limitation, the Court 
wrote the “weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial 
contributions to political candidates [were] sufficient to justify the lim-
ited effect [the restriction had] on First Amendment freedoms . . . .”44 
 Yet, unlike the contribution limitations, the various expenditure 
limitations of FECA were struck down because “Congress’ interest in 
preventing real or apparent corruption was inadequate to justify the 
heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and association that the 
expenditure limits imposed.”45 In considering the general limitation on 
campaign expenditures, the Court reasoned FECA’s disclosure re-
quirements sufficiently addressed the government’s concerns, thus de-
priving the government of any justification for this further limitation.46 
 The Court also restricted much more specific expenditure provi-
sions.47 For example, Congress attempted to restrict third-party spend-
ing in section 608(e)(1) of FECA, which created a $1000 spending limi-
tation relative to a clearly identified candidate.48 The Court, however, 
curtailed its applicability due to constitutionality concerns49 and re-
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 74. 
41 See 459 U.S. 87, 87 (1982). 
42 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13–14. 
43 Id. at 26. 
44 Id. at 29. 
45 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 121 (2003). 
46 See id. 
47 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39. 
48 See id. (“[N]o person may make any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified 
candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by 
such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds 
$1,000.”). 
49 Id. at 44 (“[I]n order to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness 
grounds, [it] must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in 
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stricted the $1000 limitation to only those independent communica-
tions that engaged in “express words of advocacy.”50 The Court also 
struck down restrictions on the amount of personal funds the candidate 
could expend, finding serious flaws in Congress’s logic that this restric-
tion would help effectuate “the prevention of actual and apparent cor-
ruption.”51 In summary, the Court found these expenditure limitations 
created “substantial and direct restrictions [on political campaigns] that 
the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”52 
 Turning to FECA’s implementation of a public financing scheme 
for presidential election campaigns, the Court again rejected plaintiffs’ 
claims of First and Fifth Amendment violations.53 It stated “the Consti-
tution does not require Congress to treat all declared candidates the 
same for public financing purposes,” and upheld the provision that al-
lowed presidential campaigns to voluntarily submit to restricted public 
funding.54 
2. BCRA and McConnell 
 The Buckley framework was subject to intense criticism,55 particu-
larly with respect to the undermining effect of loopholes.56 This led to 
the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).57 As 
with FECA, BCRA was subject to an immediate court challenge. McCon-
nell v. Federal Election Commission focused on whether the regulation of 
“soft money” (a contribution restriction) and “electioneering communi-
cations” (an expenditure limitation) infringed on First Amendment 
rights.58 
                                                                                                                      
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal 
office.”). 
50 Id. at 50. 
51 See id. at 52 (“The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment 
right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate 
his own election.”). 
52 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59. 
53 See id. at 90. 
54 See id. at 97. 
55 Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC highlighted 
a fundamental criticism of the Buckley framework. See 528 U.S. 377, 398–99 (2000) (Ste-
vens, J. concurring). He argued that “[m]oney is property, it is not speech.” Id. at 398. As 
such, Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he right to use one’s own money . . . certainly merits 
significant constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to 
the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.” Id. at 389–99. 
56 See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2096-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold). 
57 See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
58 See 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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 The first section of BCRA attempted to eliminate the well-
documented problem of “soft money.”59 FECA had defined “contribu-
tion” only to include donations made for the purpose of influencing an 
election for federal office.60 This led to a Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) ruling that contributions to state parties were not only unlimited 
and unregulated, but could also be used for a variety of purposes in 
mixed state and federal elections.61 This created a loophole through 
which donors could make unrestricted donations to state parties.62 The 
Court found “[t]he solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus 
enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the 
source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elec-
tions.”63 
 Plaintiffs argued BCRA’s contribution restrictions facially violated 
the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions.64 In rejecting 
this argument, the Court upheld its precedent, which had stated con-
tribution limits were unconstitutional only where they prevented the 
“amassing [of] resources necessary for effective advocacy.”65 The Court 
also stated unequivocally that “the prevention of corruption or its ap-
pearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political 
contribution limits,”66 thus reaffirming the standard by which contribu-
tion limits are to be tested.67 
 Plaintiffs also alleged Congress’s attempt to regulate “electioneer-
ing communications” was unconstitutional because it did not respect 
the delineation drawn in Buckley between express and issue advocacy.68 
The Court noted, however, that this section of the Buckley opinion had 
been a statutory construction, not a constitutional interpretation.69 Fi-
nally, the Court stated that none of the vagueness concerns raised in 
Buckley that prompted the “express advocacy” restriction were in issue 
with the statute as drafted by BCRA, thereby rejecting plaintiffs’ argu-
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. at 122–26, 129 (noting that Senate investigation concluded “the ‘soft money 
loophole’ had led to a ‘meltdown’ of the campaign finance system”). 
60 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2000). 
61 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123–24. 
62 See id. at 126. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 134. 
65 Id. at 135 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 
66 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143. 
67 See id. at 143–56. 
68 Id. at 190. 
69 Id. at 192. 
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ment.70 The Court did not address the constitutional issues and may 
have opened a door to Congressional regulation of other forms of 
“electioneering communications.” 
 BCRA and McConnell did not solve all campaign financing prob-
lems. “527s,” named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code un-
der which they are organized, seem to have become the conduit 
through which wealthy donors are able to contribute unlimited amounts 
of money.71 527s are regulated by the IRS, not the FEC, and although 
they must publicly report contributions exceeding $200, 527s are not 
required to abide by federal contribution limitations, resulting in large 
contributions to these groups.72 
 After the 2004 election, the FEC rejected proposals for a rule 
change that would have subjected 527s to the limitations of FECA.73 A 
strong argument was made, in vain, that 527s fulfill the major purpose 
test of Buckley, and are therefore subject to FEC regulation.74 This ar-
gument was rejected despite almost $400 million in 527 spending dur-
ing the 2004 election alone and the fact that the vast majority of dona-
tions originated from “wealthy” contributors.75 In fact, during the 2004 
election, $106 million or forty-four percent of all money raised by De-
mocratic-leaning 527s came from just fourteen donors.76 Republican-
leaning groups raised $40.45 million, (forty-percent of their total) from 
just eleven donors.77 Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling in 
McConnell that Congress may legislate to prevent circumvention of the 
rules, 527s remain beyond regulation. Thus 527s undermine the regu-
latory scheme because soft money that once flowed to the state parties 
now flows to them.78 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. at 194. The Court found FECA’s definition of an “electioneering communica-
tion” to be “both easily understood and objectively determinable.” Id. at 103. FECA de-
fined “electioneering communication as: (1) a broadcast; (2) clearly identifying a candi-
date for federal office; (3) aired within a specific time period; and (4) targeted to an 
identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. § 304(f)(3). 
71 See I.R.C. § 527 (2000). 
72 David M. Peterson, Note, Do the Swift Boat Vets Need to MoveOn? The Role of 527s in 
Contemporary American Democracy, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 767, 774–75 (2006). 
73 Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,064–65 (Nov. 23, 2004); see also 
Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 508 F. Supp. 2d 10, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (attempting to force 
FEC to issue rules subjecting 527s to FECA limitations). 
74 Trevor Potter, McConnell v. FEC: Jurisprudence and Its Future Impact on Campaign Fi-
nance, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 185, 196–98 (2006). 
75 Peterson, supra note 72, at 777. 
76 Potter, supra note 74, at 195–96. 
77 Id. 
78 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223–24. 
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B. Canada 
 The basis of modern Canadian election regulation began with the 
passage of the Canada Elections Act (CEA) in 1974.79 The Act was 
comprehensive: it imposed spending limits on both parties and candi-
dates; created contribution disclosure requirements; and set forth crite-
ria for the partial reimbursement of campaign expenses incurred by 
candidates and parties.80 Until the passage of the Canadian Charter in 
1982, however, the judiciary was restricted to interpreting the Act’s im-
plementation and could not interpret its “constitutionality.”81 One of 
the most fundamental differences from the U. S. approach is the use of 
proportionality review, premised on the notion that rights are not abso-
lute and the government may curtail them in a narrow manner with 
sufficiently serious justification.82 
1. The Alberta Cases 
 The development of Canadian election law after constitutional 
jurisdiction was established in 1982 begins with the decision of an Al-
bertan trial court, which, although only binding in Alberta, was none-
theless applied nationally.83 In National Citizens’ Coalition v. Canada 
(A.G.), an Albertan trial court struck down the CEA provision “prohibit-
ing anyone, other than registered parties or candidates, from incurring 
election expenses as defined during an election campaign . . . .”84 The 
court first held that the limitation was a prima facie infringement on 
the freedom of expression provision in section 2 of the Charter.85 It 
then applied the second step of the proportionality review of section 1 
of the Charter, and explored whether it was reasonable and “demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society.”86 In holding the limi-
tation was unjustified, the court found Parliament had enacted the 
limitation based on concerns that harm may occur under the current 
                                                                                                                      
79 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. 14 (1974). 
80 Lisa Young, Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and Weaknesses, 3 Elec-
tion L.J. 444, 446–47 (2004). 
81 Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent Expenditures: A Com-
parative View, 9 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5, 86 (2001). 
82 See, e.g., Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Can.); Nat’l Citizens’ Coal. v. 
Canada (A.G.), [1984] 32 Alta L.R.2d 249 (Can.). 
83 Id. at 89. 
84 [1984] 32 Alta L.R.2d, ¶ 12 (quoting Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. 14, § 70.1 
(1970)). 
85 Id. ¶ 55. 
86 Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Canadian Charter, § 1). 
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regime and stated that an “actual demonstration of harm or a real like-
lihood of harm [should be shown] before a limitation can be said to be 
justified.”87 
 This remained the state of the law until the 1993 passage of CEA 
amendments that sought to place a $1000 limit on third-party spend-
ing.88 In Somerville v. Canada (A.G.), the National Citizens’ Coalition 
once again filed suit in Alberta challenging the statute’s constitutional-
ity.89 The government acknowledged the provisions were in breach of 
section 2’s freedom of expression protections, but argued it satisfied 
the proportionality clause in section 1.90 The government also stated 
the Act’s goal was to level the political playing field by ensuring “that 
the spending limits on parties and candidates [were] not undermined,” 
and to guarantee “a ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ electoral system.”91 
 The Alberta Court of Appeal was not persuaded and termed the 
limit “an effective muzzle”92 and “in its effect, a ban on third-party na-
tional advertising . . . .”93 The court held the ban was a prima facie 
breach of the Charter’s right to free expression and that the govern-
ment failed the proportionality test of section 1.94 It concluded that 
even if the legislation had been of substantial importance sufficient to 
justify the infringement of certain rights, the $1000 limit was too ex-
treme “to be [justified] as a ‘reasonable’ limit on . . . core democratic 
rights.”95 Again, the Chief Election Officer chose to apply the Alberta 
ruling to the entire nation, effectively deregulating any third-party 
spending.96 
2. The Canadian Supreme Court 
 The Supreme Court of Canada first had occasion to address this 
topic in Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) when a challenge was brought against a 
third-party spending restriction in Quebec similar to the statute struck 
down in Somerville.97 The court initially found the Act violated both the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of association provisions of the 
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Charter.98 It then concluded the objectives of the Act were: (1) “to 
promote a certain equality of access to media of expression”; and (2) to 
promote the goal of informed voters.99 The goal of equal access to po-
litical communication was found to be of “pressing and substantial im-
portance in a democratic society,”100 despite the fact, as the court 
noted, that this conclusion was different from that of the Somerville 
court.101 
 The court then applied the proportionality test of section 1 and 
found there was a rational connection between the goal of Quebec’s 
legislature and the means by which it chose to pursue that goal.102 The 
court, however, then decided the statute failed the minimal impair-
ment requirement. It proceeded to describe the Lortie Commission’s 
recommendation regarding third-party expenditures as a less burden-
some alternative.103 Ultimately, although the court invalidated the re-
striction, it completely reversed the logic of Somerville.104 
 In 2000, Canada enacted amendments to the CEA.105 These 
amendments restricted third parties from advertising on polling day 
prior to the close of polling stations,106 and from spending more than a 
total of $150,000 per election or more than $3000 per district.107 The 
amendment further required third parties to identify themselves on all 
advertising materials.108 The CEA was also challenged, and the Cana-
dian Supreme Court found that although the restrictions Parliament 
enacted infringed on the freedom of expression as guaranteed by sec-
tion 2(b) of the Charter, they satisfied the proportionality requirements 
of section 1 and were accordingly upheld.109 In its analysis, the court 
stated that “[t]he current third party election advertising regime is Par-
liament’s response to this Court’s decision in Libman,” and thus “is con-
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sistent with an egalitarian conception of elections and the principles 
endorsed by this Court in Libman.”110 Given the similarities, the court 
upheld the Act, concluding that although all but one of the Act’s sec-
tions infringed on the freedom of expression, all sections satisfied the 
proportionality test of section 1.111 
C. The United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom lacks a single written document detailing the 
structure of the government and the rights of the citizenry. Rather, Par-
liament is supreme and thus, by definition, statutes cannot be chal-
lenged as unconstitutional in the British judicial system. Nonetheless, 
under Bowman v. United Kingdom,112 British electoral law may be open to 
attack on human rights grounds.113 Britain’s status as a signatory to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedom114(Convention on Human Rights) gave Phyllis Bowman the 
right to bring suit alleging a British law restricting third-party expendi-
tures in an election violated her rights under the Convention on Hu-
man Rights.115 
 The crux of the Bowman case focused on a British statute that lim-
ited third-party expenditures to five pounds. That statute defined third 
parties to include anyone unauthorized by a candidate to assist in an 
election campaign.116 The logic behind this restriction originated in 
the overall expenditure limitation imposed on British candidates.117 As 
noted with respect to other countries, spending limits can be rendered 
moot if third-party participants are not similarly handicapped.118 Thus, 
as with candidate restrictions, the goal of this restriction was to equalize 
the electoral playing field.119 
 Bowman attacked this provision as infringing on her right of free 
expression as guaranteed by article 10 of the Convention on Human 
Rights, which provides in part: 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. . . . 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it du-
ties and responsibilities, may be subject to such . . . restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society . . . for the protection of the reputation or 
rights or others . . . .120 
The European Court of Human Rights easily found “there can be no 
doubt that the prohibition contained in section 75 amounted to a re-
striction on freedom of expression, which directly affected Mrs. Bow-
man.”121 The court then proceeded to apply the proportionality test of 
section 2. 
 Although the court found the statute addressed a legitimate 
aim,122 it also found that “the restriction in question was disproportion-
ate to the aim pursued.”123 It rejected the contention that because the 
restriction only applied during the campaign cycle, Bowman was there-
fore free to campaign at any other time. The court stated the obvious: 
the most effective time to discuss political issues and seek support is 
during an election campaign, not during the indeterminable amount 
of time beforehand.124 The court also rejected other methods of com-
munication the government offered as alternatives, finding they were 
not sufficiently demonstrated as viable options or were not part of 
Bowman’s objective.125 As such, the five pound restriction was declared 
a violation of article 10 “as a total barrier to Mrs. Bowman’s publishing 
information with a view to influencing the voters . . . .”126 
 The British Parliament considered several proposals in response to 
the Bowman decision. Many focused on greater disclosure of contribu-
tions and increasing the level of public funding for political parties.127 
The ultimate result was an increase in the restriction from five to five-
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hundred pounds before the approval of the candidate is required.128 
The limit was created as a compromise that would allow third parties 
sufficient resources to participate meaningfully without requiring a 
drastic increase in the spending limit enforced on candidates.129 It re-
mains unclear, however, whether this increase will satisfy the demands 
of the Convention.130 
III. South Africa: The Future? 
 In the ten years since ratification of the South African Constitu-
tion, there has been only one case that has explicitly dealt with the issue 
of money in politics.131 During the same time, Parliament has only met 
the bare necessities of section 236 of the South African Constitution, 
which mandates public funding of political campaigns, by providing 
limited public financing to political parties.132 Finally, there is little to 
no regulation of private funding in South Africa.133 This begs the ques-
tion: “[W]hat form should the various legal ground rules required to 
control a society’s election process take, so as to best guarantee that the 
outcome of that procedure will be regarded within that society as a le-
gitimate means of apportioning political and legal rule making power?”134 
As previously discussed, the U.S. and European systems (as implemented 
in Canada and Britain) provide opposing models.135 
A. Competing Models 
1. The Libertarian/U.S. Model 
 The libertarian model focuses on the right of each citizen to par-
ticipate in the electoral process with the maximum amount of freedom 
possible.136 The result is a strong presumption against regulation unless 
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an exacting burden of proof can be satisfied.137 In the United States, 
this is embodied by the “strict scrutiny” standard, or variants thereof, 
employed by the Supreme Court in its campaign financing decisions, 
and by the Court’s advisement that only those measures that seek to 
stem corruption or the appearance of corruption will meet constitu-
tional muster.138 This feature is well-suited to emphasizing the rights of 
the individual. 
 There are, however, drawbacks to this system. Although the U.S. 
system allows limitations on contributions to parties and candidates, it 
does not allow for the limitation of expenditures.139 This permits candi-
dates, political parties, and third parties to spend unlimited amounts of 
money in pursuit of electoral victory. Prior to enactment of BCRA in 
2002, the most common method of circumventing the rules designed to 
restrict candidates and political parties was the use of “soft money.”140 
Even with the passage of BCRA and the supposed elimination of soft 
money, the funding pipeline was diverted to other sources, such as 527s. 
 In this respect, the U.S. electoral system reflects the American cul-
ture of individualism enshrined in its constitution. The focus is on the 
individual and the right of that individual to participate in the electoral 
process in largely whatever manner he sees fit. In order to protect the 
right of individuals to participate, attempts to restrict the voice of an 
individual through expenditure limitations will be struck down as an 
unconstitutional abridgement of core political speech. 
 Yet, this principled stance undermines any attempt to regulate spi-
raling campaign expenditures. As the British and Canadian systems 
recognized, unlimited third-party spending merely serves to under-
mine the limits imposed on candidates and political parties. The only 
comparable equivalent in the United States is the system of public 
funding for presidential campaigns. While BCRA fundamentally revised 
nearly all aspects of private campaign financing, it did not modify the 
provisions concerning matching public funds available to presidential 
campaigns.141 Thus, despite the myriad of changes to the presidential 
nominating process since the system’s inception in FECA, the funding 
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system remains a relic of 1974.142 The inevitable result was that candi-
dates were increasingly able to raise more than the limits imposed by 
the acceptance of public funding. Increasing numbers of candidates 
have thus chosen to reject public financing,143 again increasing the cost 
of campaigns and undermining campaign regulation. Thus, the bal-
ance in the U.S. system is slanted toward the individual’s right to par-
ticipate, generally without regard for how this may affect the perceived 
legitimacy of election results. 
2. The Egalitarian/European Model 
 The model Britain and Canada employ focuses not on the rights 
of individuals in a vacuum, but on those rights relative to the rights of 
others.144 This system explicitly attempts to equalize opportunities for 
participation so as not only to limit the temptation to circumvent 
funding limits, but also in part to help legitimize the electoral re-
sult.145 To accomplish this goal, the British and Canadian systems not 
only limit candidates and political parties, but limit third parties as 
well.146 This levels the playing field and attempts to guarantee each 
participant an equal opportunity to participate rather than simply an 
opportunity to participate, as in the United States.147 The Canadian 
Supreme Court stated that this model prevents the wealthy “from con-
trolling the electoral process to the detriment of others with less eco-
nomic power.”148 It addresses the goal of equalizing the power of all 
participants by subsidizing certain actors and restricting others to 
achieve a level playing field.149 
 The egalitarian model, however, is not without problems. Despite 
its thoroughly regulated campaign system, the British electoral system 
suffered from low public confidence in the 1990s.150 This skepticism 
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was reinforced by a scandal involving a suspicious one million pound 
donation from Formula One magnate Bernie Ecclestone to Britain’s 
Labor Party.151 This demonstrated that despite going to great lengths to 
minimize opportunities and motivations to cheat, regulations do not 
absolutely guarantee the integrity of the system. Furthermore, as high-
lighted by the Bowman case, it can be difficult to draft a statute that 
strikes the appropriate balance to satisfy the proportionality test em-
ployed in Canada and Europe.152 Canada struggled for nearly two dec-
ades before a definitive doctrine was established in Harper.153 
B. South Africa’s Current System 
 Constitutions may provide more than just the skeletal necessities 
for the ordering of government or the grouping of rights such as those 
embodied in the U.S. document. Constitutions “may also operate as a 
symbol . . . of the values . . . which [a] society aspires to foster.”154 The 
South African Constitution is such a document. At the end of the long 
nightmare of apartheid, the country sought to redefine itself through 
its constitution. When reality falls short of aspirations, however, charges 
of hypocrisy will not be far behind, perhaps endangering the legitimacy 
of the entire document.155 For South Africa to live up to the high ideals 
of its organic document regarding electoral funding, it must drastically 
reform private party financing. 
 Not only is reform needed to meet the equitable goals of its consti-
tution, South Africa’s status as a nearly one-party state creates an envi-
ronment in which regulation is necessary. As noted by Ivor Sarakinsky, 
an expert witness for the African National Congress (ANC) in Institute 
for Democracy in South Africa v. African National Congress, as of 2004 the 
ANC enjoyed a majority in excess of sixty-five percent.156 As such, the 
proportional distribution of public campaign money further en-
trenches the ANC, and smaller opposition parties are left “rely[ing] on 
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private donations to fund the bulk of their expenses.”157 Sarakinsky fur-
ther illustrates the perception of the one-party state, acknowledging 
that such private donations are difficult to obtain, as donors fear re-
taliation from the governing ANC.158 
 The South African Constitution directly addresses electoral financ-
ing.159 Section 236 reads: “To enhance multiparty democracy, national 
legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participat-
ing in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and propor-
tional basis.”160 This provision was first used during the 1999 elections 
following the passage of legislation that explicitly implemented section 
236.161 Under the implementing Act, a party must be represented in 
either the national or provincial legislature, or both, in order to qualify 
for public funding.162 The Act also outlines examples of both accept-
able163 and unacceptable uses of public funding.164 It further requires 
parties to render accountings of how the money was spent,165 and to 
return certain amounts of unspent money166 or money that is deter-
mined to be improperly spent.167 Despite the Act, it remains unclear 
whether the mandate of section 236 has been satisfied. This makes fu-
ture litigation more likely,168 as the case detailed below reveals. 
 Although public funding is seemingly well-regulated, private fi-
nancing remains largely unregulated in South Africa.169 During the 
1999 elections, a total of 53 million rand in public payments were made 
to parties, but it was estimated that 300 to 500 million rand was spent in 
total.170 It is impossible to formulate a more specific estimate due to the 
lack of regulation and disclosure. It is nonetheless obvious that parties 
received the majority of their funding from private sources, perhaps 
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undermining the intent of section 236.171 For fiscal year 2004, the situa-
tion changed little as public financing was projected to reach 74.1 mil-
lion rand while election costs were still projected to be 300 to 500 mil-
lion rand.172 
 Despite the hope that mandatory disclosure of private party fi-
nancing would follow the passage of the public funding law, no such 
system has been realized. Such a system would help shed light on the 
amount of money actually spent in South African elections.173 In what 
appears to be the only reported case in which the parties litigated the 
issue of private financing, a South African trial court concluded politi-
cal parties were not required under current law to reveal their private 
fundraising records.174 This decision was not appealed, in part due to 
the belief that the political parties involved would begin to enact party 
funding regulations.175 As of November 2006, however, more than a 
year after the decision, no action had been taken by any of the political 
parties to regulate private donations.176 
1. Judicial Treatment in Institute for Democracy in South Africa v. African 
National Congress 
 Plaintiffs brought this case under section 32(1) of the Constitu-
tion,177 suing the four largest political parties “to establish the principle 
that political parties, or at least those who hold seats in the national, 
provincial and local government legislatures, are obliged . . . to disclose 
particulars of all the substantial donations they receive.”178 They 
claimed disclosure was required under section 32(1) so that they might 
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exercise their rights under a multitude of constitutional provisions,179 
including the protection of political rights in section 19, which reads: 
Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes 
the right—  
 to form a political party; 
to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, 
a political party; and 
 to campaign for a political party or cause. 
Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for 
any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution. 
Every adult citizen has the right—  
to vote in elections for any legislative body established in 
terms of the Constitution, and to do so in secret; and 
 to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.180 
 The court found, however, that section 32 could not provide an 
independent basis for suit, and the plaintiffs could not invoke it as an 
independent cause of action unless the action was directed at the con-
stitutionality of the Promotion of Access to Information Act.181 Because 
the plaintiffs had not raised any constitutionality challenges, they were 
unable to “seek their remedy within the four corners of [the] statute,” 
as the court required.182 
 In its discussion of the constitutional aspects of the claim, the 
court found sections 41(1)(c), 152(1)(a), and 195(1) inapposite to the 
ultimate issue and dismissed them from consideration.183 The court 
also summarily dismissed the claim that the lack of access to the dona-
tion records somehow infringed on the rights contained in sections 16 
and 18, stating, “[T]here is no rational connection between the re-
spondents’ donations records and the rights derived from sections 16 
and 18.”184 
 The court did analyze the claims brought under section 19, exam-
ining “whether the applicants reasonably require the respondents’ do-
nation records” to exercise the rights contained therein.185 It con-
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cluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate with sufficient specificity 
how the lack of access to donation records infringed on their rights 
under section 19.186 Accordingly, the court found disclosure was not a 
requirement for free and fair elections, and denied the requested re-
lief.187 Yet, in closing, Judge Griesel offered a glimmer of hope, stating: 
[This] does not mean that political parties should not, as a 
matter of principle, be compelled to disclose details of private 
donations made to their coffers. It merely means that, on my 
interpretation of existing legislation, the respondents are not 
obliged to disclose such records.188 
IV. The Next Step for South Africa 
 Of the countries surveyed, South Africa is the only one with an ex-
plicit provision in its governing document calling for public funding of 
political parties.189 Why does this provision appear there but not in the 
Canadian Charter, another relatively recent document? The answer 
may partially lie in the history of the two countries. On the one hand, 
Canada’s political system has been comparatively stable and descends 
from the British system, which has produced regulations regarding po-
litical spending since 1884.190 On the other hand, modern South Africa 
inherited a history of regulatory repression.191 Given this history, the 
framers of the South African Constitution would have been keenly 
aware of the need for reliable funding and the drastic effects its ab-
sence could have on the political expression of various factions. 
 The most glaring differences between the countries reviewed 
herein center on the use of proportionality review outside the United 
States. As discussed, this review holds that rights are not absolute and 
may be infringed if the government interest is sufficiently serious and 
legitimate, and its means minimally impair the right.192 Campaign re-
strictions in Canada were thus upheld by its Supreme Court, despite 
the fact they blatantly infringed on the right of free expression, because 
the infringement was sufficiently minimal in light of the importance of 
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the government objective.193 Conversely, the United States is much 
more absolutist in its “strict scrutiny” jurisprudence.194 The “narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling government interest” test, as applied to 
political speech, is perhaps the most difficult of all to pass.195 The Su-
preme Court rejected the implementation of expenditure limitations in 
Buckley as an overbroad infringement on core political speech.196 South 
Africa has explicitly incorporated the proportionality standard into the 
text of its constitution, thus providing a substantially more flexible 
framework within which to structure a regulatory system.197 
 Given South Africa’s status as an emerging democracy, it is vitally 
important that citizens continue to have confidence in the electoral 
machinery’s capacity to produce a fair result. Corruption, or even the 
mere appearance of corruption, can result in severe erosion of public 
trust and confidence in the government.198 Since 1994, a number of 
corruption scandals have surfaced in South Africa.199 If left unchecked, 
these scandals could lead to a downward spiral in which distrust of gov-
ernment results in lower voter turnout. This, in turn, would only foster 
more discontent. 
 Because corruption flourishes in a lax regulatory environment,200 
South Africa’s reform package needs to address several points. First, 
Parliament must choose between at least two models of campaign fi-
nance regulation.201 Considering South Africa’s oppressive past and the 
presence of the proportionality standard in its constitution, it seems 
reasonable to assume the egalitarian model would be the better choice. 
One significant advantage to this model is that it addresses the imbal-
ance of wealth between the races—one of the surviving vestiges of 
apartheid.202 This means the relatively poorer black population is pro-
tected against the possibility that wealthier whites would simply drown 
out the voice of blacks. 
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 The egalitarian model will fulfill both South Africa’s interests in 
protecting the integrity of its electoral process and the flexible nature 
of its constitution. But what does this egalitarian model mean? The 
Council of Europe promulgated seven general principles with respect 
to political financing that, if adopted in South Africa, would both de-
fine the regulatory system and make great strides toward protecting the 
electoral process from the taint of corruption.203 The following princi-
ples will each be addressed in turn: 
• A balance between public and private funding; 
• Fair criteria for public funding; 
• Strict rules governing private donations; 
• A maximum allowable amount to be spent by each actor; 
• A flow of money that is transparent and available to public scru-
tiny; 
• An independent agency with auditing authority over all actors 
who are required to file; and 
• Meaningful sanctions for those who violate the rules.204 
 The current “balance” between public and private funding in 
South Africa can best be described as skewed. The level of public fund-
ing compared to the estimated expenditures reveals that public fund-
ing accounts for only a small percentage of the parties’ overall spend-
ing.205 Although not discussed as comprehensively in this Article, 
modern Germany has encountered many of the same issues as the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.206 Like these three na-
tions, it has thoroughly litigated the issue of how to balance public and 
private funding under its egalitarian framework.207 The German system 
thus offers a convenient model for South Africa. In 1992, the Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts (Federal Constitutional Court) struck down the previous 
balance that had reimbursed political parties for campaign costs.208 
The new balance stated that the level of public funding to which each 
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party was entitled was directly proportional to the amount of private 
funding the party was able to raise independently.209 
 Under the German balance, the “marketplace of ideas” is still able 
to function, albeit in a much more limited manner than in the United 
States.210 Parties are still only as viable as their ideas and their candi-
dates. This prevents a situation in which the State is forced to grant 
equal funding to a fringe party.211 Furthermore, this balance moderates 
the infringement on the right of free association by allowing parties to 
still raise private funds.212 
 Regarding eligibility for public funding, South Africa’s criteria are 
quite clearly set forth by the Funding Act and appear to have been eq-
uitably applied.213 The Act only requires that a party receive 50,000 
votes to receive a seat in Parliament, which is one of the methods to 
qualify for public funding.214 Parties may also qualify for funding if they 
are elected to seats in provincial legislatures.215 
 Despite the low thresholds for public financing, there are no re-
straints when competing for private funding in South Africa. Parties are 
permitted to receive unlimited donations from both domestic and for-
eign sources.216 The availability of foreign donations has led to a series 
of occurrences involving foreign nations that may be legal, but could 
hardly be deemed proper.217 Domestic contributions can be equally 
scandalous, as evidenced by the British scandal involving a waiver on 
tobacco advertising for Formula One.218 If South Africa wishes to avoid 
corruption and pursue an egalitarian model in which the money of no 
South African or foreign citizen may drown out the voice of a poorer 
South African citizen, then limits must be imposed. 
 The control of private funding would be greatly enhanced by plac-
ing a spending cap on actors.219 This cap, however, must not be placed 
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solely on parties and candidates, or it will merely serve to promote cir-
cumvention of the rules through the creation of third-party entities to 
which the rules do not apply,220 as seen in the United States. Rather, 
South Africa must follow Canada’s lead in restricting the spending of 
third parties in addition to other political actors. This method may ac-
tually increase competition and creativity as parties seek to stretch their 
funding to its maximum limit. Furthermore, when combined with the 
public/private funding balance previously discussed, a cap would suc-
cessfully end the arms race of campaign fundraising. Because all actors 
would be capped at a maximum amount, the pressure to continually 
raise the fundraising ante would be relieved. 
 Transparency and accountability in financing is a universal step 
toward reinforcing the integrity of any electoral system. Although wor-
thy of praise, voluntary disclosure, such as seen during the 2004 South 
African election cycle,221 is simply not enough. When drafting the 
mandatory disclosure system, the Parliament must be certain the regu-
lations are comprehensive, or it too could promote circumvention such 
as that which occurred with 527s in the United States.222 
 Yet, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, transparency and 
disclosure can also be used as a weapon against fringe parties.223 For 
example, it may be possible for a pro-apartheid party in South Africa to 
demonstrate before the courts that the forced disclosure of their bene-
factors would effectively serve to muzzle their associational rights.224 
Finally, as argued by IDASA, public disclosure allows voters to make an 
informed choice when deciding how to cast a ballot.225 
 The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is South Africa’s 
governing agency for public funding.226 Supervision of public funding, 
however, is the absolute limit of the IEC’s authority, as it has no power 
to promulgate rules or regulations regarding private funding. The 
IEC’s powers under the Funding Act, as already noted, seem to be for-
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midable.227 The natural solution to this problem thus seems to be the 
expansion of the IEC’s authority to all political funding.228 
 Along with this expansion of jurisdiction should come an expan-
sion of disciplinary authority. If the agency is only able to monitor and 
disclose funding without effective punitive measures available, the mo-
tivation to obey is lessened. The U.S. FEC is a prime example of an in-
effective agency, as a majority vote is required of its six-member board 
to initiate a disciplinary proceeding.229 The board, however, is divided 
between three Republicans and three Democrats, usually resulting in a 
tie vote—and thus inaction—on many matters.230 
Conclusion 
 Despite the problems inherent in overcoming decades of repres-
sive government and international isolation, the transition to democ-
racy and equality in South Africa has gone as well as may be realistically 
expected. If South Africa wishes to continue to make gains, however, it 
must take strides to ensure that its electoral machinery remains free 
from the taint of corruption. By implementing reforms now, as op-
posed to waiting for a national scandal to erupt, the country can make 
progress toward the goal of ensuring legitimate, stable governments. 
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